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Abstract
We present a mechanism for computing asymptotically stable school optimal matchings,
while guaranteeing that it is an asymptotic dominant strategy for every student to report their
true preferences to the mechanism. Our main tool in this endeavor is differential privacy: we give
an algorithm that coordinates a stable matching using differentially private signals, which lead to
our truthfulness guarantee. This is the first setting in which it is known how to achieve nontrivial
truthfulness guarantees for students when computing school optimal matchings, assuming worst-
case preferences (for schools and students) in large markets.
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1 Introduction
In this paper we consider the important problem of computing many-to-one stable matchings –
a matching solution concept used for diverse applications, including matching students to schools
[Abdulkadiroglu et al., 2009], and medical residents to hospitals [Roth, 1984, Roth and Peranson,
1999]. There are two sides of such a market: we will refer to the side with multiple positions
as the schools and the other side as the students. The goal is to find a feasible assignment µ of
students to schools – each student a can be matched to at most 1 school, but each school u can
be potentially matched to up to Cu students, where Cu is the capacity of school u. We would like
to find a matching that is stable. Informally, when each student a has a preference ordering ≻a
over schools, and each school u has a preference ordering ≻u over students, then an assignment µ
forms a stable matching if it is feasible, and there is no student-school pair (a, u) such that they
are unmatched (µ(a) 6= u), but such that they would mutually prefer to deviate from the proposed
matching µ and match with each other.
The set of stable many-to-one-matchings have a remarkable structural property: there exists
a school optimal and a student optimal stable matching – i.e. a stable matching that all schools
simultaneously prefer to all other stable matchings, and a stable matching that all students simul-
taneously prefer to all other stable matchings. Moreover, these matchings are easy to find, with the
school-proposing (respectively, student proposing) version of the Gale-Shapley deferred acceptance
algorithm [Gale and Shapley, 1962]. Unfortunately, the situation is not quite as nice when student
incentives are taken into account. Even in the 1-to-1 matching case (i.e. when capacities Cu = 1 for
all schools), there is no mechanism which makes truthful reporting of one’s preferences a dominant
strategy for both sides of the market [Roth, 1982]. In the many-to-one matchings case, things
are even worse: an algorithm which finds the school optimal stable matching does not incentivize
truthful reporting for either the students or the schools [Roth, 1984].
Because of this, a literature has emerged studying the incentive properties of stable match-
ing algorithms under large market assumptions (e.g. Immorlica and Mahdian [2005], Lee [2011],
Kojima and Pathak [2009]). In general, this literature has taken the following approach: make
restrictive assumptions about the market (e.g. that students preference lists are only of constant
length and are drawn uniformly at random), and under those assumptions, prove that an algorithm
which computes exactly the school optimal stable matching makes truthful reporting a dominant
strategy for a 1 − o(1) fraction of student participants (generally even under these assumptions,
the schools still have incentive to misreport if the algorithm computes the school optimal stable
matching).
In this paper we take a fundamentally different approach. We make absolutely no assumptions
about student or school preferences, allowing them to be worst-case. We also insist on giving
incentive guarantees to every student, not just most students. We compute (in a sense to be
defined) an approximately stable and approximately school optimal matching using an algorithm
with a particular insensitivity property (differential privacy), and show that truthful reporting
is an approximately dominant strategy for every student in the market. These approximations
become perfect as the size of the market grows large. Our notion of a “large market” requires
only that the capacity of each school Cu grows with (the square root of) the number of schools,
and (logarithmically) with the number of students, and does not require any assumption on how
preferences are generated.
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1.1 Our Results and Techniques
We recall the standard notion of stability in a many-to-one matching market with n students ai ∈ A
and m schools uj ∈ U , each with capacity Cj .
Definition 1. A matching µ : A→ U ∪ {⊙} is feasible and stable if:
1. (Feasibility) For each uj ∈ U , |{i : µ(ai) = uj}| ≤ Cj
2. (No Blocking Pairs with Filled Seats) For each ai ∈ A, and each uj ∈ U such that µ(ai) 6= uj,
either µ(ai) ≻ai uj or for every student a′i ∈ µ−1(uj), a′i ≻uj ai.
3. (No Blocking Pairs with Empty Seats) For every uj ∈ U such that |µ−1(uj)| < Cj, and for
every student ai ∈ A such that ai ≻uj ⊙, µ(ai) ≻ai uj.
Our notion of approximate stability relaxes condition 3. Informally, we still require that there be
no blocking pairs among students and filled seats, but we allow each school to possibly have a small
number of empty seats. We view this as a mild condition, reflecting the reality that schools are not
able to perfectly manage yield, and are often willing to accept a small degree of under-enrollment.
Definition 2 (Approximate Stability). A matching µ : A→ U∪{⊙} is feasible and α-approximately
stable if it satisfies conditions 1 and 2 (Feasibility and No Blocking Pairs with Filled Seats) and:
3. (No Blocking pairs with Empty Seats at Under-Enrolled Schools) For every uj ∈ U such that
|µ−1(uj)| < (1− α)Cj , and for every student ai ∈ A such that ai ≻uj ⊙, µ(ai) ≻ai uj .
We also employ a strong notion of approximate dominant strategy truthfulness, related to first
order stochastic dominance – informally, we say that a mechanism is η-approximately dominant
strategy truthful if no agent can gain more than η in expectation (measured by any cardinal utility
function consistent with his ordinal preferences) by misreporting his preferences to the mechanism.
Finally, we, define a notion of school optimality that applies to approximately stable matchings.
Informally, we say that an approximately stable matching µ (in the above sense) is school dominant
if when compared to the school optimal exactly stable matching µ′, for every school uj , every student
ai matched to uj in µ is strictly preferred by uj to any student matched to µj in µ
′ but not in µ.
We can now give an informal statement of our main result.
Theorem 1 (Informal). There is an algorithm for computing feasible and α-approximately stable
school dominant matchings that makes truthful reporting an η-approximate dominant strategy for
every student in the market, under the condition that for every school u, the capacity is sufficiently
large:
Cu = Ω
(√
m
ηα
· polylog(n)
)
Remark 1. Note that no assumptions are needed about either school or student preferences, which
can be arbitrary. The only large market assumption needed is that the capacity Cu of each school
is large. If, as the market grows, school capacities grow slightly faster than the square root of the
number of schools, then both η and α can be taken to tend to 0 in the limit.
This result differs from the standard large market results in several ways. First, and perhaps
most importantly, the result is worst-case over all possible preferences of both schools and stu-
dents. Second, the guarantee states that no student may substantially gain by by misreporting her
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preferences; previous results [Immorlica and Mahdian, 2005, Kojima and Pathak, 2009] show that
only a subconstant fraction of students might have (substantial) incentive to deviate. In exchange
for these strong guarantees, we relax our notion of stability and school optimality to approximate
notions, which can be taken to be exact in the limit as the market grows large (under the condition
that school capacities grow at a sufficiently fast rate).
When we do make some of the assumptions on student preferences made in previous work, we get
stronger claims than the one above. For example, when the length of the preference lists of students
are taken to be bounded, as they are in Immorlica and Mahdian [2005] and Kojima and Pathak
[2009] we can remove our dependence on the number of schools:
Theorem 2 (Informal). Under the condition that all students have preference lists over at most k
schools (and otherwise prefer to be unmatched), there is an algorithm for computing feasible and
α-approximately stable school dominant matchings that makes truthful reporting an η-approximate
dominant strategy for every student in the market, under the condition that for every school u, the
capacity is sufficiently large:
Cu = Ω
(√
k
ηα
· polylog(n)
)
Remark 2. Note that if k is considered to be a constant, then this result requires school capacity
to grow only poly-logarithmically with the number of students n.
Our results come from analyzing a differentially private variant of the classic deferred acceptance
algorithm. Rather than having schools explicitly propose to students, we consider an equivalent
variant in which schools u publish a set of “admissions thresholds” which allow any student a who
is ranked higher than the current threshold of school u (according to the preferences of u) to enroll.
These thresholds naturally induce a matching when each student enrolls at their favorite school,
given the thresholds. We first show that if the thresholds are computed under the constraint of
differential privacy, then the algorithm is approximately dominant strategy truthful for the students.
We then complete the picture by deriving a differentially private algorithm, and showing that with
high probability, it produces an approximately stable, school dominant matching.
2 Related Work
2.1 Incentives in Stable Matching
Stable matching has long been known to be incompatible with truthfulness: no algorithm which
produces a stable matching is truthful for both sides of the market [Roth, 1982], though Gale-
Shapley is known to be truthful for the side of the market which is proposing. Several lines of work
have investigated stable matching in large markets, where players’ preferences are drawn from some
distribution, and considering properties of the market as n, the number of players, grows large.
Let D be a fixed distribution over the set of n women. Consider the following process of
generating length-k preference lists over women. Draw some w1 ∼ D, and let w1 be the first
woman in a preference list. Now, let (w1, . . . , wi−1) be the first (i−1) women, in order, drawn from
D. Draw wi ∼ D until wi /∈ {w1, . . . , wi−1}. We denote such a distribution over preference lists by
Dk. [Immorlica and Mahdian, 2005] prove a generalization of a conjecture of Roth and Peranson
[1999], showing if the men draw their preference lists according to Dk, the expected number of
women with more than one stable match is o(n) (as n grows, for fixed k). Since it is known that
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Reference Assumptions # of possible stable matches
Immorlica and Mahdian [2005] Random, i.i.d. prefer-
ences on male side
1 − o(1)-fraction of women
have ≤ 1 stable match
Kojima and Pathak [2009] Random, i.i.d. prefer-
ences on student side
o(1)-fraction of schools have
more than 1 stable set of stu-
dents
Pittel [1992] Uniform random prefer-
ences on both sides
Average rank of parter for side
optimized for is log(n), nlog(n)
for the non-optimized side
Ashlagi et al. [2013] Uniform random prefer-
ences on both sides, n
men, n− 1 women
Average rank for men’s match
n
3 log(n) , for women’s match
3 log(n), in any stable match-
ing
Table 1: Related works with distributional assumptions on the preferences of one or both sides
of the market. Under these assumptions, it is often possible to show that many agents have few
(or one) stable partners. If an agent has zero or one stable partner, then she has no incentive to
misreport.
a person has incentive to misreport only if they have more than one stable partner, this implies
that only a vanishingly small fraction of the women will have incentive to misreport to any stable
matching process. They also show that any stable matching algorithm induces a Nash equilibrium
for which a 1− o(1) fraction of players behave truthfully.
Kojima and Pathak [2009] generalized these results to the many-to-one matching setting.1 In
particular, they consider student-optimal stable matchings, where colleges have arbitrary prefer-
ences, and the students have random preference lists of fixed length drawn as above. They show
that the number of schools which have incentive to misreport in the student-optimal matching is
o(n) (again, as n grows, for constant k). The paper mentions that it is possible to consider the
school-optimal stable matching and define things analogously, but that it is not clear that one can
derive truthfulness guarantees for the schools in this setting without additional assumptions. Under
further assumptions about the “thickness” of popular schools of the distribution, they show that
truthtelling forms an approximate Bayes Nash equilibrium as the number of colleges grows.
Lee [2011] considers a different method for constructing preference orderings in the one-to-one
matching setting. Each man m has an intrinsic value Vm, such that for each woman w, her utility
from being matched to m is U(Vm, ηm,w), where ηm,w is a draw from w’s private distribution for m.
This assumption is made for both sides of the market’s preferences. Under these assumptions, only
a small number of players have incentive to misreport, and there is an ε-Nash equilibrium where
almost all players report truthfully.
Azevedo and Budish [2012] introduce the notion of “strategyproofness in the large”, and show
that the Gale-Shapley algorithm satisfies this definition. Roughly, this means that fixing any
(constant sized) typespace, and any distribution over that typespace, if player preferences are
sampled i.i.d. from the typespace, then for any fixed η, as the number of players n tends to infinity,
1Here, a school has two types of misreporting: first, it might misreport its capacity for students, and second, it
might misreport its preference list over students.
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truthful reporting becomes an η-approximate Bayes Nash equilibrium. These assumptions can be
restrictive however – note that this kind of result requires that there are many more players than
there are “types” of preferences, which in particular (together with the full support assumption on
the type distribution) requires that in the limit, there are infinitely many identical agents of each
type. In contrast, our results do not require a condition like this.
To the best of our knowledge, our results are the first to give truthfulness guarantees in settings
where both sides of the market have worst-case preference orderings. Unlike some prior work, even
without distributional assumptions, we are able to give truthfulness guarantees to every student,
not only a 1−o(1) fraction of students. Under some of the distributional assumptions used in prior
work, our results can be sharpened as well.
2.2 Differential Privacy as a Tool for Truthfulness
The study of differentially private algorithms Dwork et al. [2006] has blossomed in recent years. A
comprehensive survey of the work in this area is beyond the scope of this paper; here, we mention
the work which relates directly to the use of differential privacy in constructing truthful mechanisms.
McSherry and Talwar [2007] were the first to identify privacy as a tool for designing approx-
imately truthful mechanisms. Nissim et al. [2012] showed how privacy could be used as a tool
to design exactly truthful mechanisms without needing monetary payments (in certain settings).
Huang and Kannan [2012] proved that the exponential mechanism, a basic tool in differential pri-
vacy introduced in McSherry and Talwar [2007] is maximal in distributional range, which implies
that there exist payments which make it exactly truthful. Kearns et al. [2014] demonstrated a con-
nection between private equilibrium computation and the design of truthful mediators (and also
showed how to privately compute approximate correlated equilibria in large games). This work was
extended by Rogers and Roth [2014] who show how to privately compute Nash equilibria in large
congestion games.
The paper most related to our own is Hsu et al. [2014] which shows how to compute approximate
Walrasian equilibria privately, when bidders have quasi-linear utility for money and the supply of
each good is sufficiently large. In that paper, in the final allocation, every agent is matched to their
approximately most preferred goods at the final prices. In our setting, there are several significant
differences: first, in the Walrasian equilibrium setting, only agents have preferences over goods
(i.e. goods have no preferences of their own), but in our setting, both sides of the market have
preferences. Second, although there is a conceptual relationship between “threshold scores” in
stable matching problems and prices in Walrasian equilibria, the thresholds do not play the role of
money in matching problems, and there is no notion of being matched to an “approximately” most
preferred school.
3 Preliminaries
3.1 Many-to-one Matching
A many-to-one stable matching problem consist of m schools U = {u1, . . . , um} and n students
A = {a1, . . . , an}. Every student a has a preference ordering ≻a over all the schools, and each
school u has a preference ordering ≻u over the students. Let P denote the domain of all preference
orderings over schools (so each ≻a∈ P). It will be useful for us to think of a school u’s ordering
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over students A as assigning a unique2 score score(u, a) to every student, in descending order (for
example, these could be student scores on an entrance exam). Let the range of these scores be
score(u, a) ∈ Q and Qn be the set of all valid score profiles for a given school. We will overload
the notation of Qn to refer both to the set of admissible score vectors and the set of preference
orderings over students when our use is clear from context.
Every school u has a capacity Cu, the maximum number of students the school can accommo-
date. A feasible matching µ is a mapping µ : A → U ∪ ⊙, which has the property each student a
is paired with at most one school µ(a), and each school u is matched with at most Cu students:
|µ−1(u)| ≤ Cu. If µ(a) = ⊙, we say a is unmatched by µ. For notational simplicity, we will
sometimes simply write µ(u) to denote the set of students assigned to school u.
A matching is α-approximately stable if it satisfies Definition 2. When computing matchings,
it will be helpful for us to think instead about computing admission thresholds tu for each school.
A set of admission thresholds t ∈ Rm≥0 induces a matching µ in a natural way: every student a ∈ A
is matched to her most preferred school amongst those whose admissions thresholds are below her
score at the school. Formally, for a set of admissions thresholds t, the induced matching µt is
defined by:
µt(a) = argmax≻a
{u | score(u, a) ≥ tu}
We say that a set of admission thresholds s is feasible and α-approximately stable if its induced
matching µt(a) is feasible and α-approximately stable.
Note that an α-stable matching is an exactly stable matching in a market in which schools have
reduced capacity (where the capacity at each school is reduced by at most a (1− α) factor).
Remark Definition 2 also implies that if a school u is under-enrolled by more than αCu, its
admission score tu = 0. This means such a school is very unpopular and could not recruit enough
students even without any admission criterion.
We now introduce a notion of approximate school optimality, which our algorithms will guar-
antee.
Definition 3. A matching µ is school-dominant if, for each school u, for all a ∈ µ(u) \ µ′(u)
and all a′ ∈ µ′(u) \ µ(u), a ≻u a′, where µ′ is the school-optimal matching.
In words, a matching µ is school-dominant if for every school u, when comparing the set of
students S1 that u is matched to in µ but not in the school optimal matching µ
′, and the set
of students S2 that u is matched to in the school optimal matching µ
′, but is not matched to
in µ, u strictly prefers every student in S1 to every student in S2. (i.e. compared to the school
optimal matching, a school may be matched to fewer students, but not to worse students.) We note
that school-dominance alone is trivial to guarantee: in particular, the empty matching is school
dominant. Only together with an upper bound on the number of empty seats allowed per school
(for example, as guaranteed by α-approximate stability) is this a meaningful concept.
We want to give mechanisms that make it an approximately dominant strategy for students to
report truthfully. We have to be careful about what we mean by this, since students a have ordinal
preferences ≻a, rather than cardinal utility functions va : U → [0, 1]. We say that a cardinal utility
2It is essentially without loss of generality that students are assigned unique scores. If not, we could break ties
by a simple pre-processing step: add noise
∑l
k=1
2−kbk to each student’s score, where each bk is a random bit; if the
scores are integral, the probability of having ties is 1/ poly(n) as long as l ≥ O(log(n)).
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function va is consistent with a preference ordering ≻a if for every u, u′ ∈ U , u ≻a u′ if and only if
va(u) ≥ va(u′). We will say that a mechanism is η-approximately truthful for students if for every
student, and every cardinal utility function va consistent with truthful ≻a, truthful reporting is an
η-approximate dominant strategy as measured by va.
Definition 4. Consider any randomized mapping M : Pn × Qnm → (U ∪ ⊙)n. We say that M
is η-approximately dominant strategy truthful for students (or student-truthful) if for any vector of
school and student preferences ≻∈ (Pn ×Qnm), any student a, any utility function va : U → [0, 1]
that is consistent with ≻a, and any ≻′a 6=≻a, we have:
Eµ∼M(≻)[va(µ(a))] ≥ Eµ∼M(≻′a,≻−a)[va(µ(a))] − η.
Note that this definition is very strong, since it holds simultaneously for every utility function
consistent with student preferences. When η = 0 it corresponds to first order stochastic dominance.
3.2 Differential Privacy Preliminaries
Our tool for obtaining approximate truthfulness is differential privacy, which we define in this
section. We say that the “private data” of each student a consists of both her preference ordering
≻a∈ P over the schools and her scores score(u, a) ∈ Q,3 one assigned by each school. A private
database D ∈ (P × Qm)n is a vector of n students’ preferences and scores, and D and D′ are
neighboring databases if they differ in no more than one student record. In particular, our matching
algorithm takes as input n students’ private data, and outputs a set of threshold admission scores
(i.e., the mechanism’s range is R = Qm).
Definition 5 (Dwork et al. [2006]). An (randomized) algorithm A : (P × Qm)n → R is (ε, δ)-
differentially private if for every pair of neighboring databases D,D′ ∈ (P × Qm)n and for every
subset of outputs S ⊆ R,
Pr[M(D) ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε) Pr[M(D′) ∈ S] + δ.
If δ = 0, we say that M is ε-differentially private.
3.3 Differentially Private Counters
The central privacy tool in our matching algorithm is the private streaming counter4 proposed by
Chan et al. [2011] and Dwork et al. [2010a]. Given a bit stream σ = (σ1, . . . , σT ) ∈ {−1, 0, 1}T , a
streaming counterM(σ) releases an approximation to cσ(t) =
∑t
i=1 σi at every time step t. Below,
we define an accuracy property we will then use to describe the usefulness of these counters.
Definition 6. A streaming counter M is (τ, β)-useful if with probability at least 1 − β, for each
time t ∈ [T ],
|M(σ)(t)− cσ(t)| ≤ τ.
For the rest of this paper, let Counter(ε, T ) denote the Binary Mechanism of Chan et al. [2011],
instantiated with parameters ε and T . Counter(ε, T ) satisfies the following accuracy guarantee
(further details may be found in Appendix A.2).
3This means a student’s set of scores, one from each school, can be written as Qm.
4 For a more detailed discussion of differential privacy under continual observation, see Chan et al. [2011] and
Dwork et al. [2010a].
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Theorem 3 (Chan et al. [2011]). For β > 0, Counter(ε, T ) is ε-differentially private with respect
to a single bit change in the stream, and (τ, β)-useful for
τ =
4
√
2
ε
ln
(
2
β
)(√
log(T )
)5
.
Our mechanism uses m different Counters to maintain the counts of tentatively enrolled stu-
dents for all schools. The following theorem allows us to bound the error of each Counter through
the collective sensitivity across all Counters.
Theorem 4. Suppose we have m bit streams such that the change of an student’s data affects at
most k streams, and alters at most c bits in each stream. For any β > 0, the composition of m
distinct Counter
(
ε/2c
√
2kc ln(1/δ), T
)
’s is (ε, δ)-differentially private, and (τ, β)-useful for
τ =
16c
√
kc ln(1/δ)
ε
ln
(
2
β
)(√
log(T )
)5
.
4 Algorithms Computing Private Matchings are Approximately
Truthful
In this section, we prove the theorem which motivates the rest of our paper. Consider an algorithm
M which takes as input student and school preferences ≻ and computes school thresholds t. If M
is (ε, δ)-differentially private, then the algorithm which computes thresholds t = M(≻) and then
outputs the induced matching µt is (ε + δ)-approximately dominant strategy truthful. Note that
this guarantee holds independent of stability.
Theorem 5. Let M : (P × Qm)n → Rm≥0 be any (ε, δ)-differentially private mechanism which
takes as input n student profiles and outputs m school thresholds. Let F≻ : Rm≥0 → (U ∪ ⊙)n be
the function which takes as input m school thresholds t and outputs the corresponding matching
F≻(t) = µt. Then the mechanism F≻ ◦M : (P × Qm)n → Un is (ε + δ)-approximately dominant
strategy truthful.
Proof. Fix any vector of preferences ≻, any student a, any utility function va consistent with ≻a,
and any deviation ≻′a 6=≻a. Let ≻′= (≻′a,≻−a) for brevity. Now consider student a’s utility for
truthtelling. For ε ≤ 1, we have
9
Eµ∼F≻◦M(≻)[va(µ(a))]
=Et∼M(≻)[va(argmax≻a
{u | score(u, a) ≥ tu})]
=
∑
t
P[M(≻) = t] · va(argmax≻a {u | score(u, a) ≥ tu})
≥
∑
t
e−εP[M(≻′) = t]va(argmax≻a {u | score(u, a) ≥ tu})− δ
=e−εEt∼M(≻′)[va(argmax≻a
{u | score(u, a) ≥ tu})] − δ
≥e−εEt∼M(≻′)[va(argmax≻′a
{u | score(u, a) ≥ tu})] − δ
≥(1− ε)Et∼M(≻′)[va(argmax≻′a
{u | score(u, a) ≥ tu})]− δ
≥Eµ∼M(≻′)[va(µ(a))] − (ε+ δ),
where the first and last equalities follow from the definition of the induced matching µt, the first in-
equality follows from the differential privacy condition, and the second follows from the consistency
of va with ≻a.
5 Truthful School-Optimal Mechanism
In this section, we present the algorithm which proves our main result Theorem 1. Theorem 2 com-
putes an α-approximately stable and school-dominant matching, and enjoys approximate dominant
strategy truthfulness for the student side.
Before we do this, we present DA-School, the well-known school-proposing deferred acceptance
algorithm [Gale and Shapley, 1962]. In this setting, schools which are not at capacity propose to
students one at a time, starting from their favorite students and moving down their preference
list. When a student gets a proposal, if she is tentatively matched to some other school, she will
reject the offer from whichever school she likes less and accept the offer from the school she likes
better. At this point, she is tentatively matched to the school she likes better, and the other
school will continue to make proposals to fill the seat offered to her. The version of the algorithm
we present here is non-standard – it operates by having each school set an admissions threshold,
which it decreases slowly – but is easily seen to be equivalent to the deferred acceptance algorithm.
This version of the algorithm will be much more amenable to a private implementation, which we
give next. When a school u lowers its threshold tu below the score of a student a at school u
(score(u, a)), we say that school u has proposed to student a.
It is well-known that DA-School will output a school-optimal stable matching (in our notation,
a 0-approximate school-dominant stable matching) [Roth, 1985], assuming all players are truthful.
We now state a useful fact about deferred acceptance, whose proof can be found in Appendix B.
Lemma 1. Let µt be some matching which is an intermediate matching in a run of the school-
proposing deferred acceptance algorithm. Then µt is school-dominant.
Our algorithm, Private-DA-School(ε, δ), is a private version of DA-School. At each time t,
each school will publish a threshold score (initially, for each school, this will be the maximum
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Algorithm 1: DA-School, the deferred acceptance algorithm with schools proposing
Input: school capacities {Cu}, student preferences {≻a} and scores {score(u, a)},
range of scores [0, J ]
Output: a set of score thresholds {tj}
initialize: for each school uj and student ai
counter(uj) = 0 tj = J µ(ai) = ⊙
while there is some under-enrolled school uj : counter(uj) ≤ Ĉuj and tuj > 0
do tuj = tuj − 1
for all student ai
if µ(ai) 6= argmax≻ai{uj | score(uj, ai) ≥ tuj}
then counter(µ(ai)) = counter(µ(ai))− 1;
µ(ai) = argmax≻ai{uj | score(uj, ai) ≥ tuj};
counter(µ(ai)) = counter(µ(ai)) + 1
return Final threshold scores {tj}
possible score for that school). Schools will lower their thresholds when they are under capacity; as
they do so, some students will tentatively accept admission and some will reject or leave for other
schools. Initially, all students will be unmatched. For a given student a, as soon as a school lowers
its threshold below the score a has there, a will signal to the mechanism which school is her favorite
of those for which her score passes their threshold. Then, as the schools continue to lower their
thresholds to fill seats, if a school that a likes better than her current match lowers its threshold
below her score, a will inform the mechanism that she wishes to switch to her new favorite.
Each school maintains a private counter of the number of students tentatively matched to the
school. We let E be the additive error bound of the counters. The schools will reserve E number
of seats from their initial capacity to avoid being over-enrolled, so the algorithm is run as if the
capacity at each school is Cu−E. Then each school can be potentially under-enrolled by 2E seats,
but they would take no more than α fraction of all the seats as long as the capacity Cu ≥ 2E/α.
Now, we state the formal version of Theorem 1.
Theorem 6. Private-DA-School(ε, δ) is (ε, δ)-differentially private, and hence (ε+δ)-approximately
dominant strategy truthful. With probability at least 1− β, it outputs a set of α-approximately sta-
ble admission thresholds that induces a school-dominant matching, as long as the capacity at each
school u satisfies
Cu = Ω
(√
m
εα
polylog
(
n,m,
1
δ
,
1
β
))
.
We prove Theorem 6 in two parts. Lemma 2 shows that Private-DA-School(ε, δ) is (ε, δ)-
differentially private in the students’ data. Lemma 3 shows that the resulting matching is school-
dominant so long as the capacity at each school is large enough. These two together imply Theo-
rem 6 directly.
Lemma 2. Private-DA-School(ε, δ) is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
Lemma 3. With probability at least 1−β, Private-DA-School(ε, δ) outputs a set of α-approximately
stable admission thresholds that induces a school-dominant matching, as long as the capacity at each
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Algorithm 2: Private-DA-School(ε, δ),
Input: school capacities {Cu}, student preferences {≻a} and scores {score(u, a)},
range of scores [0, J ]
Output: a set of score thresholds {tj}
initialize:
T = mnJ ε′ = ε
16
√
2m ln(1/δ)
E =
128
√
m ln(1/δ)
ε ln
(
2m
β
)(√
log(nT )
)5
for each school uj and student ai
counter(uj) = Counter(ε
′, nT ) tj = J
µ(ai) = ⊙ Ĉuj = Cuj − E
while there is some under-enrolled school uj : counter(uj) < Ĉuj and tuj > 0
do tuj = tuj − 1
for all student ai
if µ(ai) 6= argmax≻ai{uj | score(uj, ai) ≥ tuj}
then Send (−1) to counter(µ(ai));
µ(ai) = argmax≻ai{uj | score(uj, ai) ≥ tuj};
Send 1 to counter(µ(ai));
Send 0 to all other counters
else Send 0 to all counters
return Final threshold scores {tj}
school u satisfies
Cu = Ω
(√
m
εα
polylog
(
n,m,
1
δ
,
1
β
))
.
If the maximum error of each of the collection of counters is bounded by x with probability at least,
1− β, we need only
Cu = Ω(x/α)
Lemma 2. Private-DA-School(ε, δ) outputs a sequence of sets of thresholds and nothing else. We
will construct a mechanismM, which will output the same sequence of thresholds as Private-DA-School(ε, δ),
for which it is more obvious to prove (ε, δ)-differential privacy. This will imply (ε, δ)-differential
privacy of Private-DA-School(ε, δ). Here is the definition of M.
We define the input bits to the algorithmM as follows. For a fixed execution of the while loop,
we will define the bits buj′ to give to M. Let uj be the school which lowered its threshold in this
timestep. Let buj = 1 if and only if, for the unique student ai such that score(uj, ai) = t
′
uj , it is true
that uj = argmax≻ai{u | score(u, ai) ≥ tuj} (ai prefers uj to all other schools for which her score
surpasses the threshold). Let buj′ = −1 if and only if buj = 1 and also uj′ = argsecondmax≻ai{u |
score(u, ai) ≥ tuj} (uj is ai’s favorite available school and uj′ is her second favorite). For all other
j′′, let buj′′ = 0.
Then, there are at most 2m nonzero bits sent to M about a particular student ai, and at most
2 nonzero bits sent by a particular ai to any school uj. These bits are the only interface M has
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Algorithm 3: M
initialize: for each school uj
Threshold tuj = J
CapacityĈuj = Cuj − E
ε′ = ε
16
√
2m ln 1
δ
counter(uj) = Counter(ε
′, nmJ)
while there is some under-enrolled school uj : counter(uj) ≤ Ĉuj and tuj > 0
Let t′uj = tuj − 1;
Publish thresholds (tu1 , . . . , t
′
uj , . . . , t(um));
Receive bits bu′
j
∈ {−1, 0, 1} for each uj′ ;
Send buj to counter(uj);
with private data. Furthermore, M and Private-DA-School(ε, δ) have the same distribution over
output data. So it suffices to show that M is (ε, δ)-differentially private.
Let f : {J}m × [n] → {J}m be the function that, as a function of the previous thresholds and
counter values, outputs the new set of thresholds at each time t. Then, the thresholds published by
M are a composition of f , m instantiations of Counter (ε′, nmJ), and previously computed data.
Thus, it suffices to show the composition of the m counters satisfy (ε, δ)-differential privacy. By
construction, each school uj receives at most 2 nonzero bits from a given student, and no student’s
data creates more than 2m nonzero bits in all streams together. By Theorem 8 and Lemma 4, the
composition of m Counter(ε′, nmJ) satisfy (ε, δ)-differential privacy when no stream has more
than 2 bits affected by a single agent’s data and no student has more than 2m total nonzero bits in
any stream. Thus, M (and also Private-DA-School(ε, δ)) satisfies (ε, δ) differential privacy.
Lemma 3. We prove that the output thresholds {tuj} induce an α-approximately stable, school-
dominant matching µ. Recall that µ is defined to be the matching where each student chooses her
favorite school whose threshold she passes.
We claim that there can be no blocking pairs with filled seats in µ. Suppose some student ai
wishes to attend uj. Then, it is either the case that score(uj, ai) ≥ tuj or score(uj, ai) < tuj . In
the first case, ai cannot block with uj: she could have gone to uj and chose a school she preferred
to uj. In the second case, consider some ai′ such that uj = µ(ai′); this implies score(uj, ai′) ≥ tuj .
Thus, score(uj, ai′) > score(uj, ai), so ai′ ≻uj ai, and ai doesn’t block with ai′ , so there are no
blocking pairs with filled seats.
By Theorem 4 and union bound, we know that the error of all m counters over all time steps
is bounded by E except with probability β, where
E =
128
√
m ln(1/δ)
ε
ln
(
2m
β
)(√
log(nmJ)
)5
.
So, we condition on the event that all schools’ counters are accurate within E throughout the
run of Private-DA-School(ε, δ) for the remainder of our argument.
We first claim that no school is over-enrolled in µ. Consider the last time uj lowered its
threshold to tuj . Let nuj denote the number of students tentatively matched to uj just before this
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final lowering of tuj . By definition, uj only lowers its threshold whenCounter(uj) < Ĉuj = Cuj−E,
so
Cuj − E = Ĉuj > Counter(uj) ≥ nuj − E ≥ |µ(uj)| − E − 1
where the first equality is by definition, the first inequality comes from the fact that uj lowered
its threshold, the third from the accuracy we’ve conditioned on from the counters, and the final from
the fact that uj never again lowers its threshold. Thus, Cuj ≥ |µ(uj)|, and uj is not over-enrolled.
Now, we show no school is under-enrolled by more than 2E, unless tuj = 0. When the algorithm
terminates, each school uj either has a threshold tuj = 0 or
|µ(uj)|+ E ≥ Counter(uj) ≥ Ĉuj = Cuj − E
where the first equality comes from the conditional bound on the error of the counters, the
second from the fact that the algorithm terminated, and the final one from the definition of Ĉuj .
Thus, |µ(uj)| ≥ Cuj − 2E whenever tuj > 0, so no school is under-enrolled by more than an
α-fraction of its seats so long as
Cuj ≥ 2E/α.
Finally, we show school dominance. We will now show that µ, the matching corresponding to
the thresholds output by Private-DA-School(ε, δ), is also achieved by running DA-School on the
same instance, and halting early.
No school is over-enrolled, by our argument above, at any point during the run of the algorithm.
So, each proposal made by uj would be a valid proposal to make in DA-School with full capacity.
Thus, the algorithm terminates with each school having made (weakly) fewer proposals than it
would have in DA-School. Since each school makes its proposals in the same order (according to
≻uj), this implies that µ is a matching that corresponds to some intermediate point in DA-School
using with the same ordering of proposals. Thus, by Lemma 6, µ is school-dominant. This argument
is entirely parametric in E, the bounded error term from our counters, so the second part of the
claim follows directly.
Now, we proceed to prove the formal version of Theorem 2, which is a basic extension of
Theorem 6 using the fact that the sensitivity of School-Propose is reduced when students have
fewer schools in which they are interested.
Theorem 7. Suppose each student has a preference list of length at most k. Then, Private-DA-School(ε
√
m
2
√
k
, δ)
is (ε, δ)-private and thus (ε + δ)-approximately truthful. With probability at least 1− β, it outputs
a set of α-approximately stable admission thresholds that induces a school-dominant matching, as
long as the capacity at each school
Cu = Ω
(√
k
αε
polylog
(
n,m,
1
δ
,
1
β
))
Remark 3. We assume that the algorithm ignores students after they have accepted k or more
schools’ proposals.
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Theorem 2. We prove (ε, δ)-privacy, which again reduces to proving (ε, δ)-differential privacy of the
set of m counters. By a simple calculation, Private-DA-School(ε
√
m
2
√
k
, δ) uses
ε′ =
ε
4
√
k ln 1δ
as the privacy parameter for the m counters it uses. Theorem 8 states that a collection of
m Counter(ε′, nT ) with total sensitivity ∆ (and individual sensitivity c) satisfy (ε, δ)-differential
privacy so long as
ε′ ≤ ε
2c
√
∆ ln 1δ
.
Remark 3 limits the total amount of sensitivity School-Propose will have; a student will be able
to affect at most 2k bits in the input stream, so ∆ ≤ 2k, and at most 2 per school, so c ≤ 2. Thus,
it suffices to use privacy parameter
ε′ ≤ ε
4
√
k ln 1δ
,
so our algorithm is (ε, δ)-differentially private. Furthermore, Theorem 8 and a union bound
imply the maximum error any one of the counters will have at any time during the execution of
the algorithm is
E ≤ 128
√
k ln(1/δ)
ε
ln
(
2m
β
)(√
log(nmJ)
)5
.
with probability 1 − β. Thus, by Lemma 3, we get the desired guarantee for α-approximate
stability and school-dominance.
6 Conclusions
In this paper we applied differential privacy as a tool to design a many-to-one stable matching
algorithm with strong incentive guarantees for the student side of the market. To the best of our
knowledge, our work is the first work to show positive truthfulness results for the non-optimal
side of the market, under worst-case preferences, for all participants on the non-optimal sie of the
market.
Additionally, although we have not focused on this, our algorithm also provides strong privacy
guarantees to the students. Each student, upon learning the school thresholds (and hence the
school that she herself is matched to) can learn almost nothing about either the preferences or
scores of the other students (i.e. almost nothing about the preferences that the other students hold
over schools, or the preferences that schools hold over the other students). Here “almost nothing”
is the formal guarantee of differential privacy, which in particular implies that for every student
a, no matter what her prior belief over the private data of some other student a′ is, her posterior
belief over a′s data would be almost the same in the two worlds in which a′ participates in the
mechanism, and in which she does not. These guarantees might themselves be valuable in settings
in which the matching being computed is sensitive – e.g. when computing a matching between
patients and drug trials, for example.
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A Privacy Analysis for Counters
Chan et al. [2011] show that Counter(ε, T ) is ε-differentially private with respect to single changes
in the input stream, when the stream is generated non-adaptively. For our application, we require
privacy to hold for a large number of streams whose joint-sensitivity can nevertheless be bounded,
and whose entries can be chosen adaptively. To show that Counter is also private in this setting
(when ε is set appropriately), we first present a slightly more refined composition theorem.
A.1 Composition
An important property of differential privacy is that it degrades gracefully when private mechanisms
are composed together, even adaptively. We recall the notion of an adaptive composition experiment
due to Dwork et al. [2010b]:
• Fix a bit b ∈ {0, 1} and a class of mechanisms M.
• For t = 1 . . . T :
– The adversary selects two databases Dt,0,Dt,1 and a mechanism Mt ∈ M.
– The adversary receives yt =Mt(Dt,b)
The “output” of an adaptive composition experiment is the view of the adversary over the course
of the experiment. The experiment is said to be ε-differentially private if
max
S⊆R
Pr[V 0 ∈ S]
Pr[V 1 ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε),
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and (ε, δ)-differentially private if
max
S⊂R,Pr[V 0∈S]≥δ
Pr[V 0 ∈ S]− δ
Pr[V 1 ∈ S] ≤ exp(ε),
where V 0 is the view of the adversary with b = 0, V 1 is the view of the adversary with b = 1, and
R is the range of outputs.
Any algorithm that can be described as an instance of this adaptive composition experiment
(for an appropriately defined adversary) is said to be an instance of the class of mechanisms M
under adaptive T -fold composition.
A very useful tool to analyze private algorithms is the following theorem that allows us to
analyze the “composition” of private algorithms.
Theorem 8 (Dwork et al. [2010b]). Let A : U → RT be a T -fold adaptive composition5 of (ε, δ)-
differentially private algorithms. Then A satisfies (ε′, T δ + δ′)-differential privacy for
ε′ = ε
√
2T ln(1/δ′) + Tε(eε − 1).
In particular, for any ε ≤ 1, if A is a T -fold adaptive composition of (ε/
√
8T ln(1/δ), 0)-differentially
private mechanisms, then A satisfies (ε, δ)-differential privacy.
For a more refined analysis in our setting, we now state a straightforward consequence of a
composition theorem of Dwork et al. [2010b].
Lemma 4 (Dwork et al. [2010b]). Let ∆ ≥ 0. Under adaptive composition, the class of ε∆-private
mechanisms satisfies ε-differential privacy and the class of ε
2c
√
2∆ ln(1/δ)
-private mechanisms satisfies
(ε, δ)-differential privacy, if the adversary always selects databases satisfying
for all t
∣∣Dt,0 −Dt,1∣∣ ≤ c,
and also
T∑
t=1
∣∣Dt,0 −Dt,1∣∣ ≤ ∆.
In other words, the privacy parameter of each mechanism should be calibrated for the total
distance between the databases, over the whole composition. This is useful for analyzing the
privacy of the counters in our algorithm, which collectively have bounded sensitivity.
A.2 Details for Counters
We reproduce Binary mechanism here in order to refer to its internal workings in our privacy proof.
First, it is worth explaining the intuition of the Counter. Given a bit stream σ : [T ] →
{−1, 0, 1}, the algorithm releases the counts ∑ti=1 σ(i) for each t by maintaining a set of partial
sums
∑
[i, j] :=
∑j
t=i σ(t). More precisely, each partial sum has the form
∑
[2i + 1, 2i + 2i−1],
corresponding to powers of 2.
5 See Section A.1 and [Dwork et al., 2010b] for further discussion.
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In this way, we can calculate the count
∑t
i=1 σ(i) by summing at most log t partial sums: let
i1 < i2 . . . < im be the indices of non-zero bits in the binary representation of t, so that
t∑
i=1
σ(i) =
∑
[1, 2im ] +
∑
[2im + 1, 2im + 2im−1 ]
+ . . . +
∑
[t− 2i1 + 1, t].
Therefore, we can view the algorithm as releasing partial sums of different ranges at each time step
t and computing the counts is simply a post-processing of the partial sums. The core algorithm is
presented in Algorithm 4.
Algorithm 4: Counter(ε, T )
Input: A stream σ ∈ {−1, 1}T
Output: B(t), estimate of
∑t
i=1 σ(i) at each t ∈ [T ]
for all t ∈ [T ] do
Express t =
log t∑
j=0
2jBinj(t).
Let i← minj{Binj(t) 6= 0}
ai ←
∑
j<i aj + σ(t), (ai =
∑
[t− 2i + 1, t])
for 0 ≤ j ≤ i− 1 do
Let aj ← 0 and âj ← 0
Let âj = aj + Lap(log(T )/ε)
Let B(t) =
∑
i:Bini(t)6=0
âi
A.3 Counter Privacy under Adaptive Composition
Theorem 4. Suppose we have m bit streams such that the change of an student’s data affects at
most k streams, and alters at most c bits in each stream. For any β > 0, the composition of m
distinct Counter
(
ε/2c
√
2kc ln(1/δ), T
)
’s is (ε, δ)-differentially private, and (τ, β)-useful for
τ =
16c
√
kc ln(1/δ)
ε
ln
(
2
β
)(√
log(T )
)5
.
Proof. The composition of m counters is essentially releasing a collection of noisy partial sums
adaptively. We need to first frame this setting as an advanced composition experiment defined
in Appendix A.1. First, we treat each segment σ[a, b] in a stream as a database. For each such
database, we are releasing the sum by adding noise sampled from the Laplace distribution:
Lap
(
2c
√
2kc ln(1/δ) log(T )
ε
)
,
which is ε
2c
√
2kc ln(1/δ) log(T )
-private mechanism (w.r.t. a single bit change). We know that changing
an agent’s data changes at most c bits in each stream, and affects at k streams, and also each bit
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change can result in log(T ) bits changes across different stream-segment databases. Therefore, we
can bound the total distance between all pairs stream-segment databases by
∆ ≤ kc log(T ).
By Lemma 4, we know that the composition of all m counters under our condition satisfies (ε, δ)-
differential privacy.
B Proofs of Matching Lemmas
We state one more lemma which we will use in the proofs of Lemmas 6.
Lemma 5. Consider a set Pu of proposals made by each school u according to some prefix of
school-proposing DA. Let P ⊆ A × U be the set of proposals made by all schools. Then, the
matching µ which results from P is unique (and independent of the order in which proposals are
made), assuming students are truthful.
Proof. Each student ultimately accepts her most preferred proposal among the set of proposals she
has received, independent of their ordering. (i.e. admissions thresholds only descend, and she picks
her most preferred school amongst those schools with thresholds below her scores). Thus, each
school u will be matched to the subset of Pu which finds u to be their favorite offer, independent
of the order in which proposals were made.
Lemma 6. Let µt be some matching which is an intermediate matching in a run of the school-
proposing deferred acceptance algorithm. Then µt is school-dominant.
Proof. The school-proposing deferred acceptance algorithm is somewhat underspecified. In partic-
ular, if multiple schools have space remaining, the order in which those schools make proposals isn’t
predetermined. But, by Lemma 5 shows that reordering of the same proposals from the schools
will arrive at the same matching. Thus, it suffices to show, for a fixed ordering of the entire set of
proposals made by DA, that each intermediate matching is school-dominant.
Let t denote the time at which we wish to halt a run of DA. Let Pu,t denote the set of proposals
which school u has made according some fixed ordering up to time t, and Pu denote set of proposals
made by school u according to the entire run of DA. Let µt denote the “current” matching according
to the first run of DA stopped at time t and µ denote the final outcome of DA.
Consider any school A. Notice that, since |Pu| ≥ |Pu,t|, by the definition of DA,
Pu,t ⊆ Pu (1)
since, for a given school, the proposing order is just working down their preference list.
Now consider a particular school u. We must show that for each a ∈ µt(u)\µ(u), a′ ∈ µ(u)\µt(u),
a ≻u a′. If a was proposed to by u in Pt and rejects u, then u will be rejected by a when she receives
a superset P of proposals. Thus, the only students u has according to µ but not µt are students
z ∈ Pu\Pu,t (students who are proposed to after time t). But, by the definition of DA, if u proposes
to two students a and a′, and proposes to a before a′, a ≻u a′, as desired.
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C Private Matching Algorithms Must Allow Empty Seats
In this paper, we gave an algorithm with strong worst-case incentive properties in large markets,
without needing to make distributional assumptions about the agents preferences, or requiring any
other “large market” condition other than that the capacities of the schools be sufficiently large.
However, in exchange, we had to relax our notion of stability to an approximate notion which
allows a small number of empty seats per school. We here give an example demonstrating why
this relaxation is necessary for any differentially private matching algorithm. An algorithm that
must return an -exactly- stable matching must have extremely high sensitivity to the change in
preferences of any single agent, if preferences are allowed to be worst case.
Example 1. Suppose there are n students and 2 schools, H and Y . Suppose, for students 1 ≤
a ≤ n2 , H ≻a Y , and for n2 < a ≤ n, Y ≻a H. Each school has capacity for exactly half of the
students: CH = CY =
n
2 . Suppose Y has preference ordering ≻Y , s1 ≻Y s2 ≻Y . . . ≻y sn; H has
preference ordering sn
2
+1 ≻H sn
2
+2 ≻H . . . sn ≻H s1 ≻H . . . ≻H sn
2
. The school-optimal matching
matches students s1, . . . , sn
2
to Y and sn
2
+1, . . . , sn to H. Now consider the market with any single
student removed. The school-optimal stable matching changes entirely (i.e. every single student is
matched to a different school). For example, if s1 is removed, Y will admit sn
2
+1 (who will accept),
H will admit s2 (who will accept), Y will admit sn
2
+2 and so on. In the end, each student will
get her favorite school, and the schools will swap students. The same effect is achieved by having
a single student change her preferences, by reporting that she prefers to be unmatched than to be
matched to her second choice school. This example shows that the exact school-optimal matching is
highly sensitive to the addition, removal, or alteration of preferences of a single student and hence
impossible to achieve under differential privacy. Our algorithms blunt this kind of sensitivity via
the use of a small budget of seats that we may leave empty.
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